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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the years, there has been a shift from a wide command-and-control style of supervision whereby 
the regulator imposes detailed rules with which regulators supervise to one which consists of risk 
based regulatory strategies. ‘Enforced Self Regulation’, a regulatory strategy whereby negotiation 
takes places between the State and the individual firms, lies between the command-and-control style of 
supervision and meta risk regulation in that firms are still required to regulate but according to their 
own models. It differs from the traditional command-and-control style of bank supervision in that 
firms and not the regulator, are required to regulate. It is similar to meta-risk regulation in that the 
individual firm’s model is taken into consideration in regulating such firms. 
Whilst the merits and disadvantages of the individual regulatory strategies are considered, this paper 
concludes that all regulatory strategies should take into consideration the importance of management 
responsibilities – both on individual and corporate levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Regulatory Strategies 
3.1 Regulation of banks: Command and control regulatory strategies 
 
Banking supervision is based on a licensing system which not only allows supervisors to 
identify the population to be supervised, but also to control entry into the banking system.1 In 
order to qualify for and retain a banking licence, entities must observe certain prudential 
requirements. Capital adequacy constitutes one of the foundations of prudential supervision.2 
In most countries there are minimum capital requirements for the establishment of new banks 
and capital adequacy tests are a regular element in ongoing supervision.3 In the consultative 
package “The New Basel Capital Accord” issued by the Basel Committee in January 2001, 
the Basel Committee proposes a capital adequacy framework based on three complementary 
pillars: minimum capital requirements, a supervisory review process and market discipline. 
Capital adequacy is a term used to describe the adequacy of a bank’s aggregate capital in 
relation to the risks which  arise from its assets, its off balance sheet transactions, its dealing 
operations and all other risks associated with its business.4 
The aim is for a bank to have enough capital in relation to its risks to absorb the highest 
foreseeable amount of loss and still give allowance in which to realise assets, raise new 
capital or arrange for arranged disposition of its business.5 
Statutory requirements govern the minimum amount of capital which a bank must have6. 
These have been established by UK and European legislation and from internationally agreed 
recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision7. 
 
Safeguards which protect the banking system include measures such as the lender of last 
resort arrangements, deposit insurance, regulation and supervision and these may not be 
performed by one single entity. For instance, the central bank whilst performing lender of last 
resort functions, may not be responsible for regulatory and supervisory functions. Regulation 
and supervision are terms which are often used interchangeably even though these terms can 
be distinguished from one another. Regulation can be defined as the establishment of certain 
rules whilst supervision refers to the monitoring of those rules. According to the Oxford 
English dictionary, regulation is literally defined as a “rule prescribed for the management of 
some matter, or for the regulation of a conduct; a government precept or direction” whilst 
supervision is defined as “general management, direction or control, oversight, 
superintendence.”8 
 
Depending on the instructions given by the State, the bank regulator is responsible for the 
creation of secondary sources of law which include rules, standards and guidelines that 
originate from primary sources such as statute and therefore has the role of de facto law 
maker.9 The regulatory process highlights the regulator's duties in ensuring that prescribed 
rules are continuously obeyed.10 Once a bank is authorised, a regulator can assume his role of 
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monitoring such bank's activities through on-site or off-site supervision and can also exercise 
enforcement measures in the event of the bank's non compliance. In addition to regulation and 
supervision, bank regulators and central banks can also undertake the important 
complementary function of surveillance.11  
The contentious issue relating to the distinction between regulation and supervision centres on 
whether a regulator has implemented a rules or discretion based approach to carry out its 
statutory responsibilities.12 Whilst regulation is intended to prescribe how management should 
make decisions, supervision provides for a degree of discretion and judgment to be exercised 
in the decision making process. Regulation and supervision can also be distinguished 
according to whether a business is an investment business or whether it is a banking 
business.13 A range of conduct of business rules protects investors and these rules are not 
present in commercial banking except for the Banking Code which offers limited protection 
for the depositor.14 The obligations owed to an investor and a depositor under the two forms 
of business are different.15 For example, a bank has limited or no obligation to a depositor in 
explaining the reasons for decisions regarding the deposit, whereas in an investment business 
the obligation to investors is continuous so as to enable them judge the risks associated with 
the investment product bought.16 Based on this, banking is usually governed with a 
supervision-based approach, allowing for a bank to be prudently run in terms of managing its 
assets and liabilities.17 
 
 
Two general types of regulation and supervision are identified by Llewellyn:18 
 
a) Prudential regulation, which focuses on the solvency and safety and soundness of 
financial  institutions and, 
b) Conduct of business regulation which focuses on how financial firms conduct business 
with their  customers. 
The case for prudential regulation and supervision of financial firms is that consumers are not 
well equipped  to judge the safety and soundness of financial firms19 whilst conduct of 
business regulation helps to ensure  the setting up of rules and guidelines about the proper 
way in dealing with customers.20 
Banks are regulated in different ways ranging from prudential techniques designed to prevent 
systemic crisis arising in the first place to protective techniques which are used once a crises 
arises. Under techniques designed to prevent a crisis from occurring are the use of capital and 
liquidity ratios. When a crisis has occurred, the use of the safety net of deposit insurance and 
rescues are measures adopted. 
                                                                                                                                                        
system in the UK focusses on criminalising unauthorised activities and ensuring that safeguards such as 
specific fit and proper requirements for firms and persons are in place before they can carry out business 
within the market;ibid. 
11 ibid 
12 B Quinn,  ‘Rules v Discretion: The Case of Banking Supervision in the Light of the Debate on Monetary 
Policy’, Special Paper 85, July 1996 Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics 
13 D Singh, ' Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets  (2007) 84 
14 ibid p 85 
15 ibid 
16 ibid 
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18 D Llewellyn, 'The Economic Rationale For Financial Regulation'  (Financial Services Authority London 
Occasional Paper 1 April 1999)  10 - 11 
19 ibid p 10 
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Over the years, there has been a shift from a wide command-and-control style of bank 
supervision to one whereby banks are still required to regulate capital, albeit according to 
their own models. 
 
 
3.2 Meta – Risk Regulation: Risk based regulatory strategies 
 
Different explanations have been given as to why risk has become central across regulatory 
and governmental circles and these explanations are partly influenced by different approaches 
as to what risk is.21 One view in attempting to account for risk as a strategic organising 
principle in the public sector, attributes the specific needs of government.22 Political scientists, 
however suggest that the adoption of the language and practices of risk reflects a deeper, more 
complex process, one of “political isomorphism”.23 According to this view, risk becomes 
accepted and embedded in one organisation or institution such that it acquires recognition 
within other organisations and institutions.24 Other explanations, mainly from socio-cultural 
disciplines suggest that the importance of risk derives from issues related to control, 
accountability, responsibility and blame in late modern society.25 Two well-known theoretical 
perspectives addressing these are termed “risk society” theory and “governmentality” 
theory.26  These theoretical perspectives will be considered in greater depth under chapter 
five. 
 
Regulation is often perceived as consisting of command and control strategies whereby the 
regulator imposes detailed rules with which the regulator monitors compliance.27 However, 
meta-risk regulation is a type of regulatory strategy which draws firms into regulatory 
processes and attempts to both influence and make use of firms’ internal risk management and 
control strategies.28 As a result, supervision is not so much about the simple monitoring of 
firms' compliance with regulatory rules but more about evaluating and monitoring firms' 
awareness of the risks created by their business and of their internal controls.29 
 
Meta risk regulation deals with the risk management of internal risk and being able to use the 
firms' own internal risk management systems to achieve regulatory objectives.30 From this 
perspective, it therefore differs from risk-based regulation which is used by the UK’s financial 
regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and which embraces external risks.31 The 
Basel II Capital Accord provides an example of the operation of meta regulation in that bank 
capitalisation is not to be imposed externally by regulators but will be determined by a bank's 
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Rothstein and R Baldwin The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk (2001) Oxford University Press; see T 
Bennett ‘Culture and Governmentality’ in C McCarthy and J Packer (eds) Foucault, Cultural Studies and 
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27J Gray and J Hamilton,  Implementing Financial Regulation : Theory and Practice  (2006)  36 
28 ibid 
29 ibid 
30 ibid p 37 
31 Risk based supervision by the UK’s financial regulator, the FSA, considers three sources of risk ( the external 
environment, consumer/industry wide risks and regulated institutions) and therefore embraces external risks 
whereas with meta regulation, no external risk considerations are involved.  
own internal risk management models provided these models are considered by regulators to 
be adequate.32 One major advantage of meta-risk regulation is that it should enable the FSA 
exploit the expertise of the industry in an age when the complexity and volatility of modern 
risk calls into question the ability of financial regulators to stay one step ahead.33 A 
disadvantage lies with its use of  mathematical models.34 In addition, whilst Basel II builds in 
a second pillar of a supervisory review process which requires regulators to ensure the 
soundness of banks' internal risk rating processes, it has been suggested that there is scope for 
bank “gaming and manipulation” of ratings as regulators at best, have information that is not 
as much as that of banks whilst banks have access to private risk-relevant information that can 
be excluded from the rating system presented to regulators.35 Other dangers with meta-risk 
regulation involve meta-risk management seeking to leverage off firms' own systems and 
expertise in aid of reducing risks to the FSA's objectives rather than directly imposing detailed 
requirements on firms as to the design of their internal risk assessment and management 
strategies.36 
 
 
The following section introduces the concept of ‘Enforced Self Regulation’. According to this 
concept and contrasting with the command-and-control style of supervision, firms are still 
required to regulate but according to their own models. Having just discussed meta regulation, 
‘Enforced Self Regulation’, a similar concept in that the individual firm’s model is taken into 
consideration in regulating such firms, is introduced with a brief discussion on self-regulation. 
 
3.3 State Regulation or Self – Regulation ? 
 
“Decentring regulation” is used to express the notion that governments should not and do not 
have a monopoly on regulation and that regulation is now being carried out by other actors 
namely: large organisations, collective associations, professions, technical committees etc 
without government's involvement or even formal approval.37 Decentring also refers to 
changes occurring within government and administration : the internal fragmentation of the 
tasks of policy formation and implementation.38 Self-regulation fits into this analysis because 
it is a form of 'decentred' regulation as it is not state regulation.39 
 
“Responsive regulation is distinguished (from other strategies of market governance) both  in 
what triggers a regulatory response and what the regulatory response will be”.40  Ayres and 
Braithwaite also propose that  regulation be responsive to industry structure – since different 
structures will be conducive to different  degrees and forms of regulation. 
 
The Enforced Self-Regulation Model is a form of responsive regulation whereby negotiation 
occurs between the State and the individual firms to establish regulations that are 
particularized to each firm.41 In  the Enforced Self-regulation Model, each firm is required to 
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propose its own regulatory standards in order to  avoid harder (and  less  tailored) standards 
imposed by the State.42 This individual firm is “enforced” in two senses :43 
 
First the firm is required by the State to do the self-regulation. Second, the privately written 
rules can be publicly enforced. The proportion of self-regulation and rule-making by the firms 
permitted by the State is crucial and could lead to promoting or avoiding regulatory capture. 
Where more self-regulation is allowed than should be the case, then regulatory capture is 
likely to occur. This situation would not allow for sufficient accountability to the public and 
would be promoting private interests over public interests. Having delegated more 
responsibility and control than necessary to the firms, the State would not be monitoring and 
enforcing rules as effectively as it should. The system in the UK accountancy profession is 
more of a self-regulatory process – even though there is a mixture of state and self regulation. 
Self-regulation is not sufficiently enforced by the State as it should be. Therefore there is 
likelihood for abuse by the regulated. In reported cases, there has been lack of transparency 
within several accountancy organisations such as the Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants44. In the UK High Court case of AGIP (Africa) Limited v Jackson & Others 
(1990)1 Ch. 265, the lack of accountability by regulators and the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales was highlighted.45 The lack of authority of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) to examine files of accountants and 
to obtain evidence from non-UK sources was also illustrated.46   
 
Enforced Self Regulation envisions that in particular situations, it will be more efficacious for 
the regulated firms to take on some or all of the legislative, executive and judicial regulatory 
functions.47 Ayres and Braithwaite however stress that whatever particular regulatory 
functions should be “sub contracted” to the regulated firms would be dependent on the 
industry’s structure and historical performance and that delegation of legislative functions 
need not imply delegation of executive functions. 
As mentioned earlier, the issue of monitoring is crucial in the model of Enforced Self-
Regulation. In  achieving the right mix of regulatory strategies, the right reallocation of 
regulatory resources would be important.48 Direct government monitoring would still be 
necessary for firms too small too afford their own compliance groups.49 State involvement 
would not stop at monitoring as violations of the privately written and publicly ratified rules 
would be punishable by law .50 
 
Ayres and Braithwaite demonstrate that Enforced Self-Regulation might produce simple 
specific rules that would make possible both more efficient, comparable accounting and easier 
conviction of violators.51 Exploring the strengths and weaknesses of the Enforced Self-
Regulation Model would help to achieve an effective mix of state and self-regulation. The 
strengths of the Enforced Self-Regulation Model include the following:52 
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i) Rules would be tailored to match the company. 
ii) Rules would adjust more quickly to changing business environments. 
iii) Regulatory innovation would be fostered. 
iv) Rules would be more comprehensive in their coverage. 
v) Companies would be more committed to rules they wrote. 
vi) The confusion and costs that flow from having two rule books (the government’s 
and the  company’s) would be reduced. 
vii) Businesses would bear more of the costs of their own regulation. 
viii) More offenders would be caught more often. 
ix) Offenders who were caught would be disciplined in a larger proportion of cases 
than under the traditional government regulation. 
x) It would be easier for prosecutors to obtain convictions. 
xi) Compliance would become the path of the least corporate resistance. 
 
Weaknesses of the Enforced Self-Regulation Model include :53 
 
i) Regulatory agencies would bear costs of approving a vastly increased number of 
rules each year. 
ii) State monitoring would sometimes be more efficient than private monitoring. 
iii) Cooption of the regulatory process by business would be worsened. 
iv) Companies would bear increased costs in delay and paperwork from getting new 
company rules approved. 
v) Western jurisprudence might not be able to accommodate privately written rules 
being accorded the status of publicly enforced laws. 
vi) Particularistic laws might weaken the moral force of laws that should be universal. 
vii) The Model would encourage the trend to “Industrial Absolutism”. 
viii) Companies would write their rules in ways that would assist them to evade the 
spirit of the law. 
ix) Companies cannot command compliance as effectively as government. 
x) The independence of the compliance group could never be fully guaranteed.   
 
Having considered the above, points (ii), (v), (viii) and (ix) of the weaknesses of the Enforced 
Self-Regulation Model would help decide what proportion of responsibilities should be 
delegated to the State. These weaknesses could be reduced through entrusting the State with 
more responsibilities. Enforced Self-Regulation should be a process where both the State and 
individual firms collaborate with sufficient mechanisms to ensure that self-regulation is 
enforced effectively. Entrusting the firm with too much control over rules it is able to write 
and insufficient monitoring by the State would obviously would not produce an effective 
outcome. More state based rules would ensure better compliance by firms in many cases and 
this would also reduce costs regulatory agencies bear in approving rules, reduce delay and 
paper work from getting new company rules approved and ensure greater independence of the 
compliance group (through greater involvement of state in the monitoring process). Courts 
have a very important role in the enforcement process and also in helping to achieve and 
implement  responsive regulatory designs.   
 
Choosing between state and self regulation is not that simple and there are various arguments 
for and against using either state or self-regulation. Pigon's 1938 statement on regulation 
views monopoly power, externalities and informational asymmetries as creating a 
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“constructive role” for the government to help offset market failures and encourage social 
welfare.54 This view is known as the helping hand view of government.55 Those who do not 
agree with this view argue that governments do not frequently implement regulations to deal 
with market failures and this theory, known as the grabbing-hand theory also predicts that 
governments focussing more on strengthening private sector control of financial institutions 
namely banks, are more likely to promote development within these institutions than 
governments taking a more hands-on approach to regulation.56 
 
 
3.4 Good Regulatory Policy 
 
As it is difficult to choose between state regulation and self regulation and seeing that both 
have their merits, a combination of both would not be such a bad idea. The blurring 
distinction between banking, securities business and insurance and their global nature make it 
more difficult now for any regulator to fully comprehend such businesses – especially when 
such a regulator is external based.57 Regulation can also  assume many forms. Private 
regulation is sometimes used interchangeably with deregulation, free  market  or self-
regulation whilst public regulation is used interchangeably with state and government 
regulation.  However private regulation does not necessarily have to be self-regulatory as a set 
of rules could be followed by a private owned firm. State regulation in many cases involves 
external based regulatory procedures whilst self regulation attaches more weight to internal 
managerial control. For this reason, and due to the nature and complexity of financial 
conglomerates, there are merits to be considered from self-regulation. 
 
Good regulatory policy could therefore be said  to constitute an acceptance of the inevitability 
of some sort of symbiosis between state regulation and self  regulation.58  According to Rose – 
Ackerman (1988)59, good regulatory policy should be a combination of  self – regulation and 
state regulation. Issue relates to what proportion of self-regulation or state regulation should 
make up a good regulatory policy. This is of vital importance as proper delegation of a certain 
percentage of responsibilities to the state and individual institutions would reduce many of the 
disadvantages of the Enforced Self Regulation Model. 
 
Ayres and Braithwaite also argue60 that good policy analysis is not about choosing between 
the free market and government regulation nor deciding what the law should prescribe. They 
suggest that an understanding of private regulation, its interdependence with state regulation 
is required to achieve the mix of private and public regulation. 
 
Achieving the right mix of private and public regulation is one of the greatest challenges 
encountered in designing a good regulatory policy. Ayres and Braithwaite61 contend that there 
is no such thing as an optimal regulatory strategy and that there are just different strategies 
that have a mix of strengths and weaknesses. They go on to say that the appropriateness of a 
particular strategy depends on the legal, constitutional and cultural context and history of its 
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invocation. Regulatory strategies should take into consideration the importance of 
management responsibilities, both individual and corporate. The quality of the FSA’s staff has 
been named as one of the crucial elements to its success. Apart from management failures 
which contributed to the controversy surrounding Equitable Life62, its risk-based system of 
supervision (as opposed to a rule-based system), requires a light touch.63 This involves mutual 
agreement as to what risks are being run and trusting top management rather than prescribing 
strict and rigid ratios and for this reason, requires skilled staff.64 The FSA has taken a huge 
step in the direction of greater consideration of the importance of management responsibilities 
through its anticipation of a principles based system of regulation. 
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